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After a period of neglect, monopsony in the labor market seems to be regaining 
its place, both in the labor and industrial economics
1. 
Thus,  recent  contributions  focus  either  on  the  empirical  relevance  of 
monopsonistic  behavior  (Boal  and  Ransom,  1997;  Manning,  2003a;  2003b; 
Staiger  et  al,  1999)  or  on  theoretical  explanations  of  the  emergence  of  such 
behavior (Bhaskar et al, 2004; Boal and Ransom, 1997; Manning, 2003a; 2003b).  
Our emphasis is different. We take for granted the existence of monopsonistic 
labor markets but concentrate on their comparative efficiency due to supposedly 
different objectives of firms that operate on such markets. 
It is normally assumed that monopsonistic enterprises act as profit maximizers. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of wage-maximizing (WM) 
behavior  -  frequently  analyzed  in  the  corresponding  literature
2  -  on  the 
efficiency of monopsonistic labor markets, as well as to compare this efficiency 
with that of labor markets populated with profit-maximizing firms (PMFs). 
In this connection it should be emphasized that WM firms (WMFs) are most 
often identified with the Western type producer cooperatives and partnerships 
in the service sector (see, for example, Dreze, 1989; Pencavel and Craig, 1994).  
Recently,  such  enterprises  have  also  been  linked  with  the  many  insider-
controlled firms that have emerged during the privatization process in the post-
socialist countries (Blanchard, 1997; IBRD, 1996; Roland, 2000).  
In a sense, the present paper follows on from Domar’s (1966) early analysis of a 
WM  monopsony  in  the  labor  market.  However,  unlike  Domar,  we  restrict 
ourselves to a systematic comparison of the efficiency of monopsonistic WMF 
and PMF, when they operate in the labor market.  
1  Valuable recent sources that assess the relevance of the non-wage-taking phenomenon are 
Boal and Ransom (1997; 2002) and Manning (2003a; 2003b). 
2  The  comprehensive  survey  of  the  vast  literature  on  WM  firms  is  Bonin  and  Putterman 
(1987). For a concise review see Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993). 
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In Section 1 of Part II, we first define a typical family of increasing (inverse) 
labor  supply  or  wage  functions,  which  enable  both  PMF  and  WMF  to  earn 
nonnegative profit under convex technology.  
To motivate the reader, we then give a graphic illustration of this family to 
focus, in Section 2 of Part II, on the member of the family of wage functions that 
yields exactly the Pareto optimal equilibrium of a no loss making WMF. Such a 
function  always  exists.  This  also  means  that  in  the  case  considered  a  WM 
monopsony Pareto dominates its PM twin, since the latter - apart from the case 
of perfect wage discrimination - can never reach the Paretian norm.  
In  Part  III  we  represent  the  PM  monopsony  equilibrium  in  the  form 
appropriate  for  straightforward  efficiency  comparisons.  Then,  we  formally 
characterize the two types of WM monopsony equilibrium, evoked by Domar 
(1966).  
In Part IV we show that the family of wage functions, defined in part II, is 
always divided, by some neutral member-function, into an upper and a lower 
subfamily, where the former ensures the dominance of a WMF over PMF, while 
within the latter the converse is true. 
In Part V we discuss the results of systematic numerical simulations, performed 
to get an insight into the relative size of the WMF and PMF dominance regions 
as well as into the sensitivity of this size to the shape of labor’s marginal product 
curve, the curvature of labor supply functions, and the level of the entry wage. 
In  Appendix,  we  graphically  present  the  three  arguably  most  representative 
exercises, which test the sensitivity of the WMF/PMF dominance relation to the 
degree of curvature of the labor supply functions, in the “neutral” case of linear 
marginal product of labor. 
Summary and concluding remarks, where the latter also address the issue of 
how to privatize a non-wage-taking firm, are left for Part VI. 
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Pareto Dominates its PM Twin 
2.1. The S family of inverse labor supply or wage functions 
In order to define the particular one-parameter family of inverse labor supply or 
wage functions that we consider and which yields nonnegative profit for a non-
wage-taking firm, we first introduce the function of firm’s (non-capital) income 
per unit of labor or a ‘full’ wage, y:  
L
C L X
y
−
=
) (
  (1) 
where X(L) and L are the short-run production function and the labor input 
respectively, and where, by suitably choosing the measure of X, its (constant) 
price, p, is normalized to unity. Finally, C stands for fixed (capital) costs.  
The reader familiar with the theory of a WMF - see, for example, Dreze (1989), 
Bonin and Putterman (1987) - will recognize in (1) the objective function of 
such an enterprise. Here, the y function - depicted in Figures 1 and 2 below - 
will, inter alia, serve to define the steepest wage curve that yields zero profit both 
to a WM and conventional PM firm.  
In  the  monopsonistic  labor  market  a  typical  (inverse)  labor  supply  or  wage 
function faced by a firm may be represented as:  
Wk = f(L, ak) ≡ Wk(L) , L > 0 ,  (2) 
where Wk is a wage rate or a supply price of labor, L is a firm’s demand for labor 
or potential labor supply and ak is (nonnegative) parameter, which represents a 
measure of labor scarcity experienced by a firm. 
In what follows ak will be (discretely) varied so as to cover all relevant degrees of 
labor scarcity - see relation (3) and the ensuing relations (4) - (5a). 
The f function is further characterized as follows:  
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While the interpretation of (2a)-(2c) in straightforward, (2d) assumes that an 
increase in labor scarcity leads to a greater increase in the wage rate, given any 
(infinitesimal) increase in the demand for labor.  
By varying the ak parameter within the interval defined in (3) below, we obtain 
the one-parameter family of Wk functions, denoted by S:  
S = {Wk = f(L, ak) ≡ Wk(L) , ak  ∈ (ae, az)} ,  (3) 
where  the  S  family  is  bounded  from  below  by  the  horizontal  entry-wage 
schedule We , depicted in Figure 1
3, 
We = f(L, ae) = const > 0  (4) 
In (4) the ae value of ak generates the equilibrium labor use, Le , by a wage taking 
PMF:  
Le = arg [X’(L) – f(L, ae) = 0],   | e a ∀  f(L, ae) = const > 0  (4a) 
3  Note that in Figure 1, as in most of the numerical simulations of part V, we assume, for 
simplicity, that the entry-wage is insensitive to the value of the ak parameter.  
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az), which simultaneously satisfies the following two conditions, i.e., defines the 
function that has the tangency point with y=y(L): 
Wz (L) ≡ f(L, az) = y(L) ,  Wz
’
 (L) 
L
a L f z
∂
∂
≡
) , (
= y’(L)  (5) 
In (5), L = Lz represents the corresponding equilibrium employment, implied by 
az, which, following eq. (5), satisfies: 
Lz = arg[Wz
’
 (L) - y’(L) = 0] ,  Lz = arg[Wz (L) - y(L) = 0]  (5a) 
Thus, as already stated, eq. (4) defines the hypothetical case of a wage-taking 
enterprise - i.e., of zero labor scarcity faced by a single firm - while relation (5) 
defines  the  steepest  relevant  wage  function  which,  by  definition,  yields  zero 
profit both to a PMF and WMF - see the Wz curve of Figure 1.  
Figure 1. The S family of wage functions of (3), represented by the shaded area 
bordered by the horizontal line We of (4) and the steepest relevant wage curve, 
Wz , of (5). 
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Đorđe Šuvaković Olgin and Goran Radosavljević-  Mm = Wm + LW’m is marginal cost of monopsonistic labor, obtained from the wage function 
Wm , displayed below, and depicted in Figure 2; 
-  the functions y and X’ are those of (1) and (7);  
-  Lz and Le are respectively from (5a) and (4a), while the PMF labor use may be written as Lm
Π = 
arg max [Π(L) ≡X(L) – LWk(L) – C], cf. eq. (7a); 
Figure 1 is obtained using the following parameter forms: 
- X’ = 3.5-0.6L
2, C = 2.85, y = 3.5 - 0.2L
2 - C/L, We = 0.4, Wn = 0.4 + 0.0803L
2, Wm 
= 0.4 + 0.237L
2, Wz = 0.4 + 0.344L
2, Mm = 0.4 + 0.711L
2 
Note finally that, when coupled with the inequality L > 0 of (2), eqs. (2a)-(2d), 
which describe one well-behaved (inverse) labor supply or wage function, also 
ensure that any two member-functions of the S family do not have any common 
point. Among other things, this means that any member-function divides S in 
the two disjoint subfamilies. 
2.2  The Pareto dominance of a WM monopsony over its PM twin: 
The graphical example 
As  we  said,  in  this  section  we  provide  a  particular  numerically  generated 
example in which a WM monopsony achieves exactly the Pareto optimum and 
thus, by definition, Pareto dominates its PM twin, since the latter, except in the 
case of perfect wage discrimination, can never reach the Paretian norm.   
When labor is the only variable input, the WMF maximand of income-per-
worker, y, is defined as in eq. (1) above. 
At the same time, the unconstrained maximum of y in L is defined by the well-
known WMF equilibrium condition, X’(L) = y(L) , displayed in relation (14) 
below,  where  X’(L)  and  y(L)  are,  respectively,  labor’s  marginal  product  and 
income-per-labor-unit functions, and where the product price, p, is taken to be 
the numeraire, p = 1. 
Suppose  now  that  one  family-member  wage  function  -  denoted  by  Wm(L), 
defined in eq. (12), and depicted in Figure 2 – intersects the y(L) function of eq. 
(1) just at its maximum,  y
m L , of eq. (12a).  
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Wm(L) = X’  (5b) 
Thus,  for  the  Wm(L)  wage  function,  the  WM  monopsony  equilibrium,  Ly
m, 
coincides with the Pareto optimum, Ly
P - see also Figure 2. Hence, by definition, 
a WMF Pareto dominates PMF, and, in the case considered, a WMF produces 
(about) 12% more output than its PMF twin. 
3. The Equilibrium of a PM and WM Monopsony: A general comparison 
3.1. The two forms of the PM monopsony equilibrium 
Starting  from  (2),  the  economic  profit  of  the  PM  monopsony,  Π   may  be 
represented as:  
Π = X(L) – LWk(L) – C ,   (6) 
where X(L) and C appear in (1). 
The standard first order condition for the maximum of Π  in L reads: 
X’(L) – [Wk(L) + LW’k(L)] = 0 ,   (7) 
where X’ and  ( ) f Wk ′ ≡ ′  respectively denote the first derivatives of X and Wk 
with  respect  to  L,  and  where,  from  (6),  the  value  of  L  which  achieves  the 
maximum of Π  may be written as: 
L
Π = arg max [Π(L) ≡X(L) – LWk(L) – C]  (7a) 
The standard PM monopsony equilibrium condition, obtained from (7), reads: 
X’(L) = Wk(L) + LW’k(L) ≡Mk(L) ,   (8) 
where the R.H.S. of eq. (8) is the marginal labor cost of a PM monopsony, 
denoted by Mk(L). 
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below - we will write the PMF equilibrium of (8) in the form 
X’(L) - LW’k(L) ≡ gk(L) = Wk(L)   (8a) 
Where, obviously, we have: 
gk(L) < X’(L) , L>0 ,   (8b) 
0 ) ( < ′ ≡
∂
∂
L g
L
g
k
k ,  0 ≥ L  
Finally, the corresponding second order condition, derived from (7), is 
X’’ - 2 k W′  - L k W ′ ′  < 0  (9) 
where X’’ and  ( ) f Wk ′ ′ ≡ ′ ′  respectively denote the second derivatives of X and 
Wk. 
3.2. The WM monopsony constrained equilibrium 
Depending  on  the  degree  of  labor  scarcity,  the  monopsonistic  WMF  is 
characterized by the two types of equilibrium, initially considered, though for 
different reasons, by Domar (1966). 
The first type of equilibrium is the constrained one. Here the wage function 
Wk(L) is binding on the maximum of y(L) - see point C in Figure 2 below - 
where this maximum reduces to 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 arg sup = − = L W L y L k
y
c ,  (10) 
where: 
Wk(L) ≡ f(L, ak) , ak  ∈ (am, az)   (10a) 
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c L  of (10) within the open 
interval 
y
m
y
c z L L L < <  ,  (11) 
where Lz and  y
m L  are given in (5a) and (12a), while the am value of the labor 
scarcity parameter of (10a) – which generates the maximum of y in L - is defined 
as follows: 
am | f(L, am) ≡ Wm(L) = y( y
m L ),  (12) 
where in (11) the maximum of y in L has been denoted by  y
m L , i.e.: 
y
m L = arg max y(L)  (12a) 
Finally, the entire subfamily of Wk(L) functions of (10a) - which is a subfamily 
of S - may be written as: 
c
y S = {Wk(L) | Wm(L) < Wk(L) < Wz(L)} ,  (13) 
where Wm(L) is of (12), and where the Wz(L) function is defined in (5).  
As  will  be  demonstrated  in  Part  IV,  within  the  c
y S   subfamily,  a  WM 
monopsony exhibits greater efficiency than a PM monopsony - compare also 
the typical WMF and PMF equilibrium points generated within this family, and 
respectively denoted by C and G in Figure 2 below. 
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The second type of WM monopsony equilibrium is obtained when the wage 
function Wk(L) is not binding on the maximum of y(L) of (1):  
y
L
C L X
X ≡
−
= ′ ) (
  (14) 
The  subfamily  of  wage  functions,  that  yield  the  WMF  unconstrained 
equilibrium of (14), is generated by varying the ak parameter between its values 
ae and am , of (12) and (4a), and will be denoted by S
u : 
S
u = {Wk(L) | We < Wk(L) < Wm(L)} ,   (14a) 
As will be shown in Part IV, within the part of the S
u subfamily - denoted by  u
y S  
- a WM monopsony efficiency dominates its PM twin, just as within the WMF 
constrained equilibrium region,  c
y S , defined in the previous section. 
The ‘wage-maximizing’ u
y S  subfamily just introduced can be presented via the 
typical wage function Wk, 
Wk = Wk(L) ≡ f(L, ak) , ak  ∈ (an, am] ,  (15) 
u
y S = {Wk(L) | Wn(L) < Wk(L) < Wm(L)} ,   (16) 
where Wm (L) is from (12), and where Wn (L) - which will be labeled the neutral 
wage function - may be written as: 
Wn = f(L, an) ≡ Wn (L)   (17) 
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1Figure  2.  The  PM,  the  WM  constrained,  and  the  Paretian  PM  equilibrium, 
respectively represented by the points G, C, and P. The point M also defines 
both the WM unconstrained and the (identical) Paretian equilibrium 
 
- the PMF equilibrium employment, LП, is from (7a); 
- the WMF constrained,  y
c L , employment equilibrium is from (10); 
- the Pareto optimal labor use, LP, is from (21) below; 
- the M point is defined by the unconstrained maximum of y,  y
m L , given in (14a), and the 
corresponding (maximal) value of y = ym , M=( y
m L , ym); 
- the Pareto optimal labor use 
P
y L , is identical in the case considered with the optimal labor use 
by a WM monopsony,  y
m L , defined by (12a) - see also eq. (5b) of Part II; 
- the functions Wk , Wm and gk are respectively from (2), (12) and (8a); other functions are 
already depicted in Figure 1. 
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demonstrated in subsection 1.2 of Part IV
4, is that it generates the maximum of 
Π(L), 
Π
n L , equal to the unconstrained maximum of y, given in (12a):  
( ) ( ) [ ]
y
m
n n
L
C L LW L X L
=
− − =
Π max arg
  (18) 
Thus, an of (17) represents the degree of labor scarcity which yields the same 
equilibria  for  a  PMF  and  WMF.  The  linear  version  of  Wn(L)  is  depicted  in 
Figure A1 of Appendix. 
In  what  follows,  we  will  denote  by  Sy  the  family  that  consists  of  disjoint 
subfamilies  c
y S  and  u
y S , where, by analogy with the set notation
5, we can write   
u
y
c
y y S S S ∪ = ,  O S S
u
y
c
y / = ∩   (19) 
Given the definitions of  c
y S  and  u
y S  of (13) and (16), the Sy subfamily may also 
be written as:  
Sy = {Wk = f(L, ak) ≡ Wk(L) , ak  ∈ (an, az)} ,  (19a) 
where az is that given by (5). 
Finally, we introduce the remaining subfamily of S, denoted by SΠ, and making 
again the analogy with the set notation, we may write 
SΠ = S \ Sy   (20) 
or, via the typical wage function Wk,  
                                                
4  See equation (33) and the related part of the text.  
5  Note however that one should always make a clear distinction between sets and families of 
functions. 
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where ae and an respectively appear in (4) and (17). 
4. The Alternating Dominance of a WM and PM Monopsony 
4.1. The dominance of a WMF over PMF within the Sy subfamily of S 
The dominance of a WMF over PMF within the  c
y S  subfamily of S 
In  the  model,  for  the  typical  wage  function  of  S,  the  Pareto  optimal 
employment, L
P, depicted in Figure 2, is defined by the standard equation of 
Pareto optimum in the labor market:   
L
P = arg[X’(L) – Wk(L) = 0] ,   We ≤ Wk(L) ≤ Wz(L)   (21) 
At the same time, the local dominance of a WMF over PMF, or vice versa, is 
defined as follows:  
Definition 1 - The Local Efficiency Dominance - Given the S family of wage 
functions, which all yield nonnegative profit both to a WMF and PMF, a WMF 
(PMF)  is  defined  to  locally  efficiency  dominate  a  PMF  (WMF)  if,  for  some 
function in S, a WMF (PMF) employs more labor, and thus produces more 
output and makes a greater total surplus than a PMF (WMF).  
Now, starting from (1), we may write the first derivative of y(L) as: 
( ) ( )
L
L y L X
L y
− ′
≡ ′ ) (
  (22) 
Also, solving (22) for X’(L) and substituting the latter into (8a), we can write the 
PMF equilibrium of (8a) in the form appropriate for a direct comparison of 
firms’ employment and output, and thus of efficiency: 
Wk(L) = y(L) – L[W’k(L) – y’(L)] ≡  gk(L) ,  (23) 
20
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On  the  other  hand,  within  the  c
y S   subfamily  of  (13),  the  WMF  constrained 
equilibrium from (10) always satisfies the condition - see also point C in Figure 2: 
Wk(L) = y(L)  (24) 
Now, within the relevant interval, given in (11), we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) y
m z k L L L L y L W , , 0 ∈ > ′ > ′   (25) 
Hence,  due  to  (25),  it  follows  that  in  (23)  the  gk(L)  function  satisfies  the 
following inequality:  
gk(L) < y(L) ,  ( ) y
m z L L L , ∈   (26) 
The  monopsonistic  PMF  equilibrium,  L
П,  obtained  via  the  gk(L)  function,  is 
depicted in Figure 2 above, where the G point of this Figure may be written as G 
= (L
П, W
П), where: 
L
П = arg [gk(L) - Wk(L) = 0] , W
П = Wk(L
П)  (27) 
Now, since Wk is increasing in L, and due to (24), (25), (26) and (21), for any 
wage function of  c
y S , a WMF has a higher employment,  y
c L  (and output) than 
a PMF, L
П, though less than the Pareto optimal one (L
P):  
L
П <  y
c L  < L
P ,   (28) 
where  y
c L  is given in (10). 
Finally, we summarize relation (28) by the following lemma:  
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y S   subfamily  of  wage  functions  a  WMF  efficiency 
dominates a PMF.  
The dominance of the WMF over PMF equilibrium within the  c
y S  subfamily of 
wage functions is depicted in Figure 2 above.  
The dominance of a WMF over PMF within the  u
y S  subfamily of S 
Now we focus on the  u
y S  subfamily of wage functions - defined in (16) - which 
allow a WM monopsony to reach its unconstrained equilibrium but, as will be 
easily seen, still ensure the dominance of such a firm over its conventional PM 
twin.  
A  curious  feature  of  the  upper  boundary  function  of  u
y S   which,  as  already 
pointed out, is Wm(L), is that it generates the identity of the Pareto optimal and 
WM equilibrium - due to (12a), (14) and (12) :  
( ) ( ) ( ) , L W L y L X y
m m
y
m
y
m y = = ′   (29) 
where  y X′  denotes the WMF labor’s equilibrium marginal product.  
At the same time, for the Wm(L) wage function, a PMF is still inferior to a WMF 
since, due to (8) and k = m, we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) L X L W L W L L W L X y m m m ′ = > ′ + = ′ Π ,  (30) 
that is, 
( ) ( ) y
m m y L L L X L X <  ′ > ′ Π
Π =  P L ,  (30a) 
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P is 
the Pareto optimal labor use of (21). 
Thus,  it  appears  that  there  always  exists  some  wage  function  -  the  Wm(L) 
function in our case - for which a non-wage-taking WMF reaches the Pareto 
optimum, and thus Pareto dominates the non-wage-taking PMF. 
Furthermore, a decrease in the ak parameter from its am level does not affect the 
WMF equilibrium,  y
m
y L L = . 
On the other hand, a decrease in ak (expectedly) increases the PMF labor use, L
П. 
To verify this, we write the PMF equilibrium of (8) as: 
X’(L) = f(L, ak) + Lf’(L, ak)   (31) 
Then, we differentiate (31) with respect to ak and use the envelope theorem to 
obtain, due to (2c), (2a) and (9a): 
0
2
<
′ ′ − ′ − ′ ′
′ +
=
f L f X
f L f
da
dL k k a a
k
  (31a) 
Thus, with ak decreasing from am of (12) to ae of (4a), the PMF equilibrium labor 
use, L
П, is strictly monotonically increasing, until it (hypothetically) reaches its 
wage-taking level 
Π
e L  of (4a), where, due to X”< 0, we have: 
y
m e L L >
Π   (32) 
But,  this  further  implies  that  there  always  exists  some  value  an  of  the  ak 
parameter, where ae < an < am , and the corresponding neutral wage function 
Wn(L) ≡ f(L,an), already introduced in (17), which defines the identity between 
the PM and WM employment - see equation (18), which we write again here:  
( ) ( ) ( ) y
m n n L C L LW L X max arg L = − − = Π   (33) 
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u family of wage functions there always exists a 
single wage function, Wn(L), which equalizes the PMF and WMF equilibrium 
and thus implies identical efficiency of the two types of firm. At the same time, 
note that Wn(L) divides the Sy
u
 family in the disjoint subfamilies Sy
u and SП, 
respectively defined in (16) and (20a). 
We now collect the results of this subsection to obtain the following lemma:  
Lemma  2.  Within  the  Sy
u  subfamily  of  wage  functions  a  WMF  efficiency 
dominates PMF.  
Finally, we integrate Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, to obtain: 
Lemma 3. Within the Sy family of wage functions a WMF efficiency dominates 
PMF, where, using again the set notation,  u
y
c
y y S S S ∪ = ,  O S S u
y
c
y / = ∩ . 
4.2.  The dominance of a PMF over WMF within the SΠҎsubfamily of S and The 
Alternating Dominance Theorem 
Due to the previous results, for the remaining SΠ subfamily of wage functions, 
defined in (20) and (20a), we immediately get the following lemma: 
Lemma  4.  Within  the  SΠ  subfamily  of  wage  functions  a  PMF  efficiency 
dominates  a  WMF,  where  SΠ  =  S  \  Sy,  i.e.,  where  Sy  and  SΠ  are  disjoint 
subfamilies. 
Finally, we integrate Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 to get the general proposition on 
the alternating (efficiency) dominance of a WMF and PMF:  
Proposition 1 - The Alternating Dominance Theorem. Given the income-per-
worker function y = y(L), the continuous S family of all relevant wage functions 
- that make no losses both to a WMF and PMF - is divided by one, neutral 
member-function, Wn(L), into two disjoint subfamilies, Sy and SП , where for any 
function of Sy a WMF dominates PMF, while for any function of SП the converse 
is true. 
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insight into the relative size of Sy and SП , and single out the major factors that 
explain this size.  
5. The WMF/PMF Dominance Ratio, δ, and the size of the WMF and PMF 
Dominance Regions 
We  now  temporarily  assume  that  S  is  not  a  continuous  but  discrete  family, 
characterized with a small uniform step in the ak scarcity parameter, ∆ak = ∆a, 
k  =  1,…,n  ,  where  n  is  big.  Thus  we  will  have  the  (big  number  of)  wage 
functions, evenly spread across S.  
In principle, to measure the (approximate) size of relevant subfamilies one can 
count the wage curves that belong to these subfamilies
6.  
In  order  to  calculate  the  WMF/PMF  dominance  relation,  we  first  introduce 
what seems to be its natural definition:  
Definition 2. The WMF/PMF dominance relation is identified with the δ ratio, 
where the numerator and denominator of δ respectively reduce to the shares of 
Sy and SП in S, and where these shares, denoted by N(Sy) and N(SП), represent 
the size of the WMF and PMF dominance regions,  
) (
) (
Π
=
S N
S N y δ  ,  (34) 
where: 
δ
δ
+
=
1
) ( y S N  ,  
δ +
= Π 1
1
) (S N   (35) 
                                                
6  Given the total of 30 simulations, see Tables 1-3 and Footnote 11 below, we had to omit the 
counting procedure. Instead, as approximation, we have applied the Borell measure, which is 
error-free in the case of continuous families, while in the (present) discrete case it makes the 
computational error arbitrarily small, provided the number of family-member functions is 
arbitrarily big.  
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dominance, as distinct from local dominance: 
Definition 3. Given the S family of wage functions, a WMF (PMF) is defined to 
globally dominate PMF (WMF) if the δ dominance ratio is greater (smaller) 
than unity.  
To get an idea about the magnitude of the δ ratio  and about the major factors 
that explain this magnitude, we present in Tables 1-3, displayed at the end of 
this section, the corresponding systematically organized numerical simulations. 
A few of them are also graphically presented in Appendix. 
First, the simulations examine the sensitivity of δ to switches from technologies 
T1, in which labor’s marginal productivity X’(L), is a strictly concave function of 
to T2 technologies, typical of linear X’(L), and, finally, to technologies with a 
strictly  convex  X’(L).  Of  course,  the  technologies  are  selected  so  as  to  be 
commensurable, in the sense that - given the price of output p(=1), fixed capital 
costs,  C,  and  the  entry-wage,  We  -  they  yield  income  per  worker  functions, 
characterized by (approximately) the same maximum, Ly
m(≈1.98), and the same 
(maximal) value of income per worker, computed at this maximum, ym(≈1.26). 
The changes in δ due to switches of technologies can be seen by looking at any 
row of Tables 1-3.  
Second, the simulations focus on the sensitivity of δ to changes in the degree of 
curvature of the family-member (inverse) labor supply or wage functions. These 
functions are first assumed to be linear, S1, then quadratic, S2, and, finally, cubic, 
S3. Here, the resultant changes in δ can be seen by looking at any column of 
Tables 1-3. 
Third, simulations examine the sensitivity of δ to changes in the entry wage, We, 
that assumes values of 0.4 (Table 1), 0.63 (Table 2) and 1.0 (Table 3), which 
respectively comprise around 30%, 50% and 80% of the maximal income per 
worker, ym≈1.26. Here, the underlying changes in δ can be seen by looking at its 
particular values in each field of Table 1, and then in the corresponding field in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
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in δ assume the following regularities: 
i) δ increases  by  switching  from  T1  to  T2,  and,  then,  from  T2  to  T3 
technologies; 
ii) δ increases with the curvature of the wage functions, i.e., by switching from 
linear to quadratic and, then, to cubic wage functions; 
iii) A fall in the entry wage, We    leads to an increase in the δ ratio.  
As  for  the  direction  and  magnitude  of  the  δ  ratio,  it  appears  that  a  WM 
monopsony strongly dominates its profit-maximizing twin
7.  
Thus, the WMF dominance region is (significantly) greater than that of a PMF 
in 26 of 27 simulations performed.  
Finally, the average magnitude of the δ dominance ratio, denoted by  δ and 
based on all 27 simulations, is very high and implies that, on average, around 
94%  of  all  the  wage  functions  considered  belong  to  the  WMF  dominance 
regions
8.  
In Appendix we graphically present the WMF and PMF dominance regions, 
obtained for We=0.4, linear X’(L) and, respectively, for the families of linear, 
quadratic and cubic wage functions. 
 
                                                
7  The values of δ=δij (i,j=1,2,3), and thus of  N (Sy), are approximate - see Footnotes 6 above 
and 11 below. 
8  To test the robustness of the performed simulations, we have also done the three modified 
exercises, where the (previously parametric) entry-wage has been modeled as an increasing 
function  of  the  labor  scarcity  parameter.  The  simulations  have  been  designed  to  be 
comparable with the three arguably most representative simulations - of column 2, Table 2. 
However, this exercise has not altered the tenor of the previous results - the WMF average 
dominance region has become 91%, comparing to 93% of the corresponding fixed entry wage 
simulations.  
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2Table 1. The values of the δ  dominance ratio for the entry-wage We = 0.4; δ = δij 
(i,j=1,2,3) is of Definition 2 of Part V. The technologies T1, T2 and T3, and the 
wage functions S1, S2 and S3, are also of Part V.  
 
We = 0.4 
T1 
X’ = 3.5 – 0.6L
2 
y = 3.5 – 0.2L
2 – C/L
C = 2.85 
T2 
X’ = 2 – 0.4L 
y = 2 – 0.2L – C/L
C = 0.680 
T3 
X’ = 2.08/(1.45L
0.2)  
y = (2.6/1.45L
0.2)–C/L 
C = 0.600 
an = 0.231 
az = 0.505 
an = 0.160 
az = 0.743 
an = 0.227 
az = 0.980 
S1 
Wn = We + an L 
Wz = We + az L  δ11 = 1.19  δ12 = 3.64  δ13 = 3.32 
an = 0.0803
 
az = 0.344 
an = 0.0850 
az = 1.01 
an = 0.0790 
az = 1.86 
S2 
Wn = We + an L
2 
Wz = We + az L
2  δ21 = 3.28  δ22 = 10.9  δ23 = 22.5 
an = 0.0314 
az = 0.261 
an = 0.0350 
az = 1.61 
an = 0.0314 
az = 4.15 
S3 
Wn = We + an L
3 
Wz = We + az L
3  δ31 = 7.31  δ32 = 45.0  δ33 = 131 
 
Table 2. The values of the δ  dominance ratio for the entry-wage We = 0.63; 
δ = δij (i,j=1,2,3) is of Definition 2 of Part V. The technologies T1, T2 and T3, 
and the wage functions S1, S2 and S3, are also of Part V.  
 
We = 0.63 
T1 
X’ = 3.5 – 0.6L
2 
y = 3.5 – 0.2L
2 – C/L
C = 2.85 
T2 
X’ = 2 – 0.4L 
y = 2 – 0.2L – C/L
C = 0.6800 
T3 
X’ = 2.08/(1.45L
0.2)  
y = (2.6/1.45L
0.2)–C/L 
C = 0.600 
an = 0.171 
az = 0.363 
an = 0.172 
az = 0.490 
an = 0.166 
az = 0.628 
S1 
Wn = We + an L 
Wz = We + az L  δ11 = 1.12  δ12 = 1.85  δ13 = 2.78 
an = 0.0595 
az = 0.231 
an = 0.0620 
az = 0.564 
an = 0.0580 
az = 1.00 
S2 
Wn = We + an L
2 
Wz = We + az L
2  δ21 = 2.88  δ22 = 8.10  δ23 = 16.2 
an = 0.0232 
az = 0.161 
an = 0.0250 
az = 0.756 
an = 0.0230 
az = 1.86 
S3 
Wn = We + an L
3 
Wz = We + az L
3  δ31 = 5.94  δ32 = 29.2  δ33 = 79.9 
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Đorđe Šuvaković Olgin and Goran RadosavljevićTable 3. The values of the δ dominance ratio for the entry-wage We = 1; δ = δij 
(i,j=1,2,3) is of Definition 2 of Part V. The technologies T1, T2 and T3, and the 
wage functions S1, S2 and S3, are also of Part V.  
 
We = 1 
T1 
X’ = 3.5 – 0.6L
2 
y = 3.5 – 0.2L
2 – C/L
C = 2.85 
T2 
X’ = 2 – 0.4L 
y = 2 – 0.2L – C/L
C = 0.680 
T3 
X’ = 2.08/(1.45L
0.2)  
y = (2.6/1.45L
0.2)–C/L 
C = 0.600 
an = 0.0750 
az = 0.149 
an = 0.0720 
az = 0.168 
an = 0.0690 
az = 0.195 
S1 
Wn = We + an L 
Wz = We + az L  δ11 = 0.987  δ12 = 1.33  δ13 = 1.83 
an = 0.0260 
az = 0.085 
an = 0.0260 
az = 0.136 
an = 0.0240 
az = 0.204 
S2 
Wn = We + an L
2 
Wz = We + az L
2  δ21 = 2.27  δ22 = 4.23  δ23 = 7.50 
an = 0.0102 
az = 0.0510 
an = 0.0110 
az = 0.124 
an = 0.00900 
az = 0.245 
S3 
Wn = We + an L
3 
Wz = We + az L
3  δ31 = 4.00  δ32 = 10.3  δ33 = 26.2 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have compared the short-run efficiency of profit- and wage-
maximizing firms (PMFs and WMFs) when they operate at the monopsonistic 
labor market. To perform the comparison, we have first ruled out any type of 
wage discrimination as well as the (possible) existence of a market for WMF 
membership rights. We have then defined local efficiency dominance, according 
to which one no loss making firm dominates the other when, for a single inverse 
labor supply or wage function, the former produces more output - and thus 
creates a greater total surplus - than the latter.  
For well-behaved wage functions we have then varied a suitably defined labor 
scarcity parameter, from zero to its zero-profit level. Given a turned U-shaped 
income-per-worker schedule, the latter level defines the steepest wage curve that 
yields zero profit both to a WMF and PMF, and therefore has a tangency point 
with the income-per-worker schedule. We have thus generated the continuous 
family of wage functions, all of which ensure nonnegative profit for a PMF and 
WMF where, by definition, the number of such functions is infinite. 
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functions, we finally demonstrate that this family is always divided, by some 
neutral member-function, into the upper and lower subfamily, where for any 
function  of  the  former  a  WMF  (locally)  dominates  a  PMF,  while  for  any 
function of the latter the converse is true. Hence, we also show that, in general, 
for a given single wage function, a WMF can efficiency dominate a PMF, and 
vice versa.  
After detecting this alternating WMF/PMF dominance, we have focused on the 
size of the PMF and WMF dominance regions, identified with the ratio of shares 
of the corresponding subfamilies in the above defined family of all relevant wage 
functions.  
To achieve this, we have temporarily assumed that this family is discrete, where 
its member-functions, the number of which is big, are evenly spread across the 
family. This leads to the introduction of the concept of global dominance, where 
one firm is defined to (globally) dominate the other when the former locally 
dominates the latter for more than a half of wage functions that constitute the 
entire family. 
After  this,  we  have  performed  27  systematically  organized  numerical 
simulations,  which  combine  three  types  of  technology,  three  types  of  wage 
functions, and three levels of the entry-wage. It turns out that these simulations 
present some remarkable regularities. 
First,  the  simulations  indicate  that  the  WMF  dominance  region  (relatively) 
increases by switching from technologies with a concave marginal product of 
labor to those characterized by a convex labor’s marginal productivity. Second, 
this region also increases by switching from families of linear wage functions to 
families of (strictly) convex functions with smaller curvatures and, finally, to 
families  that  consist  of  more  convex  (wage)  functions.  Third,  the  WMF 
dominance is stronger for lower levels of the entry wage. 
Here, the basic result is that, on average, a WMF (strongly) globally dominates 
PMF, where the average size of the WMF dominance region amounts to 94% of 
all considered wage functions, and where just one of 27 simulations yields (a 
modest) PMF’s dominance.  
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for  monopsonized  labor  market  there  exists  a  type  of  maximizing  behavior 
(often discussed in the corresponding literature), where this behavior may well 
be superior to conventional profit-maximization.  
Finally, two notes on the novel concept of global efficiency dominance are in 
order.  
First,  the  concept  does  not  seem  to  be  restricted  to  the  present  case  of 
monopsonistic labor markets and could also be used under some other market 
structures, e.g. under monopoly and monopolistic competition. 
Second, on the empirical level, the concept would require each family-member 
function to be weighted by the probability of its occurrence at the market in 
question. Still, on the theoretical level, here considered, the (implicitly) assumed 
equal probability of all member-functions seems legitimate. This is due to the 
fact that all considered wage functions enable firms to make no losses, and from 
this perspective it seems reasonable not to discriminate between them, at least 
not on this stage of analysis. 
The third note may be of relevance for the theory and policy of privatizing a non 
wage-taking firm, which is supposed to be the wage maximizer. If in such a case 
one reveals the local dominance of a WMF over PMF, a higher local efficiency 
of the former - due to its objective of wage maximization - ought to be weighed 
against the possibly higher technical productivity of the latter, observed in many 
outsider-privatized  PM  firms  (see,  for  example,  Frydman,  Gray,  Hessel  and 
Rapaczynski (1999)).  
In any case, and irrespective of these remarks, the key result of the paper clearly 
points  to  the  fact  that  in  non-wage-taking  environments,  and  with  equal 
technical  and  market  opportunities,  a  wage-maximizing  firm  may  be  more 
efficient,  both  locally  and  globally,  than  a  conventional,  profit-maximizing 
enterprise.  
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rEfErEnCESAPPENDIX: A graphical presentation of the WM and PM dominance regions for 
the three types of wage functions
9 
Figure A1. The WMF and PMF dominance regions, identified with the Sy and 
SП  subfamilies of the discrete  S family, are approximated by the darker and 
lighter shaded areas, bordered by the Wz, Wn, and We functions: The case of 
linear labor’s marginal product and linear wage functions, δ12 = 3.64, see Table 1 
of Part V. 
 
X = 2L – 0.2L
2   - production function 
X’ = 2 – 0.4L    - labor’s marginal product 
y = 2 – 0.2L – C/L  - income per worker 
C = 0.68      - fixed costs 
We = 0.4      - entry wage horizontal line, ak = 0 
ak = a       - typical (varying) labor scarcity parameter 
Wk = We + akL
2   - typical wage function 
Wn = We + anL   -  neutral wage function that implies equal equilibrium 
  of WMF and PMF, an = 0.160 
                                                
9  Note  that  in  this  Appendix  the  product  price  is  p=1.  Also,  as  mentioned  in  Part  V,  the 
maximum point of income per worker is approximately the same in all Figures: M = (Lm
y, 
ym)≈(1.98, 1.26). 
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33Wz = We + azL - wage function that implies zero-profit and identical equilibrium 
    of a WMF and PMF, az = 0.743 
 
Figure A2. The WMF and PMF dominance regions, identified with the Sy and 
SП subfamilies of the discrete  S family, are approximated by the darker and 
lighter shaded areas, bordered by the Wz, Wn, and We functions: The case of 
linear  labor’s marginal product  and quadratic wage functions,  δ22= 10.9, see 
Table 1 of Part V.  
 
X, X’, y , C, We, ak, and Wk - as in legend of Figure A1 
Wn = We + anL
2    - neutral wage function, defined as in Figure A1, an = 0.085  
Wz = We + azL
2    - zero-profit wage function, defined as in Figure A1, az =1.01  
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Đorđe Šuvaković Olgin and Goran RadosavljevićFigure A3. The WMF and PMF dominance regions, identified with the Sy and 
SП subfamilies of the discrete S family, and approximated by the darker and 
(very small) lighter shaded areas, bordered by the Wz, Wn, and We functions: 
The case of linear labor’s marginal product and cubic wage functions, δ32 = 45.0, 
see Table 1 of Part V. 
 
X, X’, y , C, We, ak, and Wk - as in legend of Figure A1. 
Wn = We + anL
3    - neutral wage function, defined as in Figure A1, an = 0.0347  
Wz = We + azL
3    - zero-profit wage function, defined as in Figure A1, az =1.61  
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